Hegel and the metaphysics of absolute negativity pdf
Hegel and Schelling both agree with kant that this brand of metaphysics had lost its appeal and validity. He anticipates the Hegelian objections you describe here, this anticipation is basically what undermines his Der Weltalter project. The equivocation there is key: for it highlights the simultaneity of the Absolute as both the subject who represses and the object repressed. Hey man…thanks for posting your comments.
However, I have spent some time in his later work, especially as it relates to his critique of Hegel. It appears then that Schelling got the last laugh. Or, did he? When reading his critique of Hegel I often wonder to what extent he reads Hegel accurately.
That is, Schelling takes negative philosophy to be concerned with determining the nature of objects and, thus, the mere possibility of existence. Until, of course, it encounters its limit: pure actuality whose nature is to exist necessarily. Schelling too anticipates most critiques of Hegel, esp. Much of this is underdeveloped here, obviously. But, perhaps we can exchange arguments in a way that increases our understanding of both Schelling and Hegel.
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Paul Giladi. A short summary of this paper. Download Download PDF. Translate PDF. ISBN The question now is what kind of metaphysician is Hegel. Not only that, a further question that one may well ask is what kind of revisionary metaphysics is Hegelian metaphysics: is Hegelian metaphysics a revision of metaphysica generalis, or is Hegelian metaphysics a revision of metaphysica specialis? There is good reason to think that Bowman means the former kind of revisionary metaphysics, but it may perhaps be more helpful to have this made as explicit as possible.
In Chapter 1, Bowman presents his interpretation of the general dialectic between Hegel and Kant and Jacobi. He argues that Hegel was committed to a particularly robust form rationalism, one which identifies thought with being. However, the way in which Hegel is understood to arrive at his absolute idealism is in fact determined by some acceptance of certain points made by both Kant and Jacobi. Hegel agrees with their respective claims that the categories of the understanding are not equipped or suitably structured to grasping being as it is in itself.
However, contra Kant, Hegel does not separate thought and being, since on the Hegelian analysis the categories are conditions of experience and also determinations of being itself.
Contra Jacobi, Hegel claims that philosophical science does not lead to nihilistic consequences which are severely detrimental to the idea of human freedom and agency. Click here to sign up. Download Free PDF. Hegel's Metaphysics and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Alper Turken. A short summary of this paper.
Hegel s Metaphysics and the Hard Problem of Consciousness Over the last decades, we have seen various attempts to argue for the contemporary significance of Hegel s thought.
On the other hand, most if not all of these contemporary engagements with Hegel are charged with an anxiety towards a very central aspect of Hegel s thought: Hegel s etaph si s. This a iet is at at the sou e of t o o o attitudes adopted by many contemporary thinkers towards Hegel: 1 Ignore the metaphysical aspects of Hegel s thought a d fo us o so e pa ti ula Hegelian concept such as recognition or semantic holism and its promise to contribute to specific contemporary philosophical problems, 2 develop a so called non- etaph si al eadi g of Hegel s s ste hi h u de sta ds Hegel s Logi as a atego theory that articulates thought and various types of knowledge claims about the world.
Many Hegel scholars such as Stephen Houlgate, Frederick Beiser and Rolf-Peter Horstmann have argued that the non-metaphysical interpretations are incompatible with the historical Hegel. However, despite promising attempts from philosophers such as James Kreines and Brady Bowmann, the ways in which a metaphysical reading of Hegel can contribute to contemporary issues in philosophy remains unclear. The motivation of this paper is to sket h a pote tial appli atio of Hegel s etaph si s to a specific problem in contemporary philosopy of mind.
Specifically, I will argue that approaching what Da id Chal e s alled as the ha d p o le of o s ious ess e uipped ith Hegel s o ept of the true infinite opens up some novel conceptual possibilities on this central problem of the contemporary philosophy of mind.
At the heart of what Chalmers calls the hard problem of consciousness lies a very familiar feature of consciousness. Consciousness is phenomenal. It involves experience. It has an irreducible subjective aspect. According to Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness is concerned with explaining how and why physical processes give rise to phenomenal consciousness.
A solution to the hard problem would involve an account of the relation between physical processes and consciousness, explaining on the basis of natural principles how and why it is that physical processes are associated with states of experience Chalmers , Chalmers argues that there is no materialist or a reductionist solution to the hard problem and the hard problem of consciousness motivates a non-materialist and a non-reductionist ontology. Chalmers rejection of a materialism of consciousness is based on three interrelated arguments.
While I do not have the time to discuss these a gu e ts i detail, I ill iefl e tio ea h to p ese t a o e ie of Chal e s s thesis. Then I will sketch the outline of a potential Hegelian contribution to the debate.
First of the arguments is the explanatory gap argument. While cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind have made considerable advances in explaining various functions of consciousness such as ability to discriminate, categorize and react to environmental stimuli, the integration of information by a cognitive system, the reportability of mental states, the ability of a system to access its own internal states, for Chalmers, an explanation of none of these functions amounts to explaining why and how experience exists.
Chalmers key conceptual point is the following: explaining cognitive functions does not suffice for the explanation of why experience and the phenomenon of subjectivity exists.
As Thomas Nagel put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism and this cannot be reduced to any cognitive function. Chalmers says: When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in the visual field Then there are bodily sensations from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion; and the experience of a stream of conscious thought.
What unites all of these states is that there is something like to be in them. All of them are states of consciousness In this e t al se se of o s ious ess , a o ga is is o s ious if the e is something it is like to be in that state.
Chalmers , p. A physical theory of consciousness can at most explain structure and functions but not the subjective aspect of consciousness. What cannot be explained physically cannot be physical. The second argument is the conceivability argument and goes back to Descartes. It has many versions including the famous zombie argument from Kripke. I will quote here the version from William Seager.
According to the conceivability argument, it is conceivable that consciousness could vary independently of physical state. If a claim is conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible which means it is not ruled out a priori.
Thus it is possible that consciousness could vary independently of physical state. Therefore, consciousness is not ontologically dependent on the physical. If consciousness is not ontologically dependent on the physical, then it is not physical. Finally, the third argument is the knowledge argument.
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